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FEDERAL LEASED HOUSING ASSISTANCE IN
PRIVATE ACCOMMODATIONS: SECTION 8
[T]o promote the general welfare of the Nation by employing its
funds and credit ... to alleviate present and recurring unemploy-
ment and to remedy the unsafe and insanitary [sic] housing
conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary
dwellings for families of low income ... that are injurious to the
health, safety and morals of the citizens of the Nation.1
With this declaration in the Housing Act of 1937,2 Congress first
articulated federal.housing policy. While this policy has remained es-
sentially intact, the legislative and administrative means to its imple-
mentation have been replaced periodically with new and allegedly
more efficient strategies. Public housing "projects," such as those
created by the original legislation, 3 were the dominant mediums for
housing the poor and the elderly well into the 1960's.4 The Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1965 added Section 23 leasing,5 under
which the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) began leasing privately owned units and subletting them
to low-income tenants. Under this program, HUD paid the difference
between the market rental price and what the low-income sublessee
would have had to pay for public housing. Implementation of Section
23 was limited, however, by provisions requiring local approval' and
restricting its use to instances where it was more economical than
public housing.
7
Although Section 23 was retained in the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968,8 it was less important than the key pro-
grams of that legislation, Sections 235' and 236,1° which provided as-
' 150 Stat. 888, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1971).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See Catz, Historicaland Political Background of Federal Housing Programs, 50 N.D. L.
REV. 25, 26-33 (1973).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1421b. (1970). See generally Friedman & Krier, A New Lease on Life:
Section 23 Housing and the Poor, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 611 (1968).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1421b.(a)(2) (1971).
7 Id. § 1421b.(a)(1) (1971).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1421b. (1971).
9 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1971).
10 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1971).
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sistance to low income families by paying a large portion of the mort-
gage interest payments on their homes."
From the time of their enactment until 1973, Sections 235 and 236
of the 1968 Act became the object of increasing attack from Congress
and the Administration. The problems centered around poorly built
housing, excessive profit-taking, and other abuses by speculators and
unscrupulous developers.' 2 The abandonment, vandalism, and neglect
associated with the Section 235 program eventually led to charges
and convictions of fraud against HUD officials. 3 An investigation by
the United States Department of Justice revealed that certain Federal
Housing Administration agents had become involved in payoff
schemes.' 4 Moreover, roughly 26 percent of the mortgages under the
Section 236 program were in default status by 1972.'
The public housing program, which does not involve private
developers, was also criticized as wasteful, poorly conceived, and
inequitable.'" Further, it appeared to some that the federal govern-
ment was assuming the losses caused by the accelerating decline of
large cities.1 7 As a result of various investigations and HUD audits,
the FHA was in a state of chaos after recurring reorganizations.' The
administration's suspension of housing subsidies on January 5, 1973'0
was an added impetus for the passage of a new act.
The resulting legislation, the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974,20 is the federal government's first significant set of
housing programs since the 1968 Act.2' Although there are eight titles
in the Act, -2 this article will examine only one major provision: leased
11 Id. See generally SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 93D
CONG., IST SESS., AN ANALYSISOFTHE SECTION 235 AND 236 PROGRAMS (Comm. Print 1973).
12 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1972 at 27, col. 3; Note, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 461 (1972).
'3 N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1972, § 4, at 12, col. 1.
'4 There has been a continuing investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Justice since 1972. As of February, 1975, there were more than 150 guilty
pleas or convictions in the Eastern District of Michigan alone. These cases involved real
estate brokers and salespeople, contractors, and HUD employees. At least twenty more
were expected to face charges in the immediate months thereafter. Detroit News, Feb. 12,
1975, at 22A, col. 5.
,5 N.Y. Times, July 24, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
16 Id., Jan. 2, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
17 Id.
18 Id., July 24, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
19 Id., Jan. 9, 1973, at 1, col. I; See 32 CONG. Q. 692 (Mar. 16, 1974) (a rebuttal of
administration charges that the programs were scandal ridden, inequitable, too costly, and
ineffective).
20 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
21 The only other omnibus housing bill which Congress considered after the 1968 Act was
killed by the House Rules Committee in 1972. S. 3248, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (Aug. 22, 1972).
22 The following are the major titles in the Act: Title I, Community Development, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1401 (Supp. 1975); Title II, Assisted Housing, id. § 1437; Title III, Mortgage
Assistance, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1707 (Supp. 1975); Title IV, Comprehensive Planning, 40
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housing in private accommodations, better known as Section 8.23 This
section is a revival, in modified form, of Section 23 leased housing.
The creation of Section 8 will be briefly reviewed,24 followed by an
examination of its mechanics." The advantages of leased housing over
public housing will be assessed,26 and Section 8 will be compared with
its predecessor, Section 23 of the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1965.27 Finally, some possible weaknesses of Section 8 will be
noted.21
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The leased housing assistance provisions of the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974 were among the major points of
contention between the House and the Senate. 29 The Senate bill30
would have reinstated for an indefinite period the subsidized home
ownership (Section 235 Housing) and rental and cooperative housing
provisions (Section 236 Housing) of the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1968. It was argued that, in contrast to leased housing,
these programs had good records of furthering new housing con-
struction.
31
The House bill32 would have continued Section 235 and Section
236 only through fiscal 1975.33 Most new funds would have been
channeled into a rental assistance subsidy program. The original form
of rental assistance, Section 23 leasing, had never developed into a
program of major proportions; 34 the revival of the program may be
viewed as a reaffirmation by the House of the potential benefits to be
U.S.C.A. § 461 (Supp. 1975); Title V, Rural Housing, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1471 (Supp. 1975); Title
VI, Mobile Homes, 88 Stat. § 700 (1974); and Title VII, Home Mortgage Assistance, 12
U.S.C.A. § 1464 (Supp. 1975).
23 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f. (Supp. 1975).
24 See part I infra.
22 See part II infra.
26 See part III infra
27 42 U.S.C. § 1421b. (1971).
28 See part IV infra.
29 120 CONG. REC. 14,879 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974); 32 CONG. Q. 1702 (June 29, 1974).
30 S. 3066, §§ 402, 502, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974).
31 120 CONG. REC. 14,895 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974).
32 H.R. 1114, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974).
33 Id. § 207(a).
34 From inception of the program in 1965 to 1974, only 150,000 units were leased under
§ 23. S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1974). See Catz, supra note 4, at 34-35 for
some suggested reasons for this slow implementation. Among these are the limitations on
rentals which the agency was authorized to pay, segregation practices, and a HUD freeze on
funds if the vacancy rate in the community fell below 3 percent.
In contrast to Section 23, the number of subsidized starts for new construction under other
federal programs was 1,527,098 for the same years. A. DOWNS, FEDERAL HOUSING SUB-
SIDIES: THEIR NATURE AND EFFECTIVENESS AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT THEM 11
(1972).
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derived from leased housing assistance in private accommodations. 5
The final 1974 provision was an expedient compromise 36 between
the divergent positions of the House and Senate which ended a month-
long deadlock of the Joint Conference Committee. 37 In general, the
House provisions for subsidized leasing of private accommodations
prevailed. The final bill continues Sections 235 and 236 only through
fiscal 1976. 31 Further, Section 236 is to be implemented only when
Section 8 will be inadequate.39 The funding authorization for Section
8 can not at present be compared with that of Sections 235 and 236,
because, although funds are earmarked for all other programs in the
1974 Act, there is no specific statutory authorization for Section 8.40
Although the House preferred to channel most funds into Section 8, 41
leased housing assistance will not be the exclusive form of housing
assistance under the Act. Public housing, under Sections Four through
Seven of the Act,42 will continue to have an important role in the
overall federal housing program.
II. SUMMARY OF SECTION 8
The overall effect of Section 8 is to enable low-income families to
rent from private landlords housing units which, absent the subsidy,
they could not afford. Section 8 does not subsidize projects by paying
a part of the mortgage interest as did Sections 235 and 236. 43 Unlike
3' See part III A infra.
36 Former HUD Secretary James T. Lynn said that the original Senate bill would have
been vetoed by the administration. 32 CONG. Q. 2253 (Aug. 17, 1974). This is apparently
because of the administration's steadfast opposition to Sections 235 and 236. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 14, 1973, § 4, at 3, col. 2.
37 See Nenno, The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974: An Interpretation;
Its History, 31 J. HOUSING 344 (1974).
38 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1715z(m) and 1715z-l(n) (Supp. 1975).
39 1974 U.S. CODE, CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3892 (JOINT CONFERENCE REPORT No. 93-1279,
2d Sess.) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
40 The issue is further confused by the fact that different reports on the Act state differing
amounts as the Section 8 authorization. See 1974 U.S. CODE, CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3866for
a quotation of $440 million. In contrast, see Extension and Major Reforms of Existing
Housing Assistance Programs, 31 J. HOUSING 355, 356 (1974), for an estimate of $619 million.
Significantly, neither report cites a source for these figures.
4' The House Banking and Currency Committee reported that
despite the reluctance of the committee to rely on a single program to meet the
Nation's diverse housing needs, it concurs in the intention of the Administra-
tion to utilize section 23(h) as the primary vehicle for providing housing
assistance. The new program, if properly administered, can be an effective
substitute for all existing housing programs except the section 235 homeowner-
ship program.
H.R. 1114, supra note 32, at 18. The exception was understandably made for Section 235
since that provides for homeownership rather than leasing.
42 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437b.-1437e. (Supp. 1975).
41 See note 11 supra.
Journal of Law Reform
earlier programs such as Section 221(d) (3) of the 1963 Act,44 Sec-
tion 8 does not authorize loan funds for the construction of housing
units. Instead, Section 8 authorizes "rental assistance payments" on
behalf of low-income families.4 The following subparts of this note
discuss the most important facets of this program.
A. Contracting by the Secretary or
Local Housing Agency
Section 8 of the Act authorizes contracts under which a housing
agency would agree to make rental assistance payments to participat-
ing owners of existing rental properties for the benefit of qualifying
"low-income families."46 Such contracts will normally run between
local public housing agencies (PHA) and private owners; however,
in areas in which no local housing agency exists or when it can not
perform this function, the Secretary of HUD may contract directly
with private lessors.47 Similar contracts may be entered into with
prospective owners of newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated
rental housing.48
B. Amount of Assistance Payments
The amount of the assistance payment for any participating rental
unit will be the difference between the "maximum monthly rent" 49
and the amount the tenant is required to pay.5" This assistance pay-
ment is paid directly to the landlord by the PHA (or by the Secretary
when no PHA is participating)."
"Maximum monthly rent" is a term of art signifying a ceiling on the
rental charge specified in every assistance contract.52 The local PHA
and the Secretary of HUD have limited discretion to set this ceiling.
Normally the "maximum monthly rent" will closely approximate the
"fair market rental" of similar units in the area, a figure established
by HUD.' :' An allowance for utilities and other services is included in
4 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(3) (1971).
45 See note 46 and accompanying text infra.
46 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(a). "Low income family" is defined in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a.
(Supp. 1975).
47 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(b)(1) (Supp. 1975).
41 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(b)(2) (Supp. 1975).
49 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(3) (Supp. 1975).
50 Id.
5, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(b)(1) (Supp. 1975).
52 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(1) (Supp. 1975).
53 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 1975). The "fair market rental" is established on a
citywide basis rather than varying according to neighborhoods. Within a city, the rental
varies according to the classification of the unit. There are two basic factors in classifying:
type of unit and amenities. The rental rate structure for existing units differs from that of
[VOL. 8:676
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the "fair market rental" as established by HUD.54 However, if the
owner can show increased operating costs, 55 the "maximum monthly
rent" may exceed the "fair market rental" by 10 percent.5 If the Sec-
retary determines that special circumstances exist, the "fair market
rental" may be surpassed by 20 percent.57 Annual adjustments of
maximum monthly rents, or more frequent "interim revisions . . . as
market conditions warrant,"58 are provided to ensure that the owner's
total reimbursement is an accurate reflection of the current market
rental level.
The tenant's contribution to his rent is a percentage of his monthly
income, varying from 15 percent to 25 percent, depending upon fac-
tors such as income, family size, medical expenses, and unusual
nonrecurring expenses. 5
C. Housing Unit Qualification
Only units leased to an "eligible family ' 6 qualify for assistance
payments; however, up to 100 percent of the units in any building may
be eligible.6 ' The election of the number of participating units is left
primarily to the owner, although the Secretary of HUD may give
preference to applicants who limit their subsidy participation to 20
percent in any large building. 62
D. Tenant Selection and Eviction
Whether a unit is classified as "existing," or "newly constructed," or
"substantially rehabilitated," selection of tenants is made by the
newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated units. Within the class of existing units,
rentals vary according to number of bedrooms, whether or not there is an elevator, and
whether the unit is detached or not. Proposed HUD Reg. § 1280.101 (Schedule A), 39 Fed.
Reg. 43,944 (1974). Rentals vary according to the number of bedrooms and presence of an
elevator but not according to detachment within the class of newly constructed or substan-
tially rehabilitated. Proposed HUD Reg. § 1280.102 (Schedule B), 40 Fed. Reg. 1902 (1975).
It is significant that increasing rentals are provided for units which have zero to four
bedrooms. This reflects at least a possible interest in the larger units and recognizes the fact
that the Joint Conference Report of the House and Senate pointed out "the conferees wish to
emphasize the urgent need to provide adequate housing for large families through the
construction or substantial rehabilitation of units containing three or more bedrooms."
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 39, at 3969.
54 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(1) (Supp. 1975).
'5 Proposed HUD Reg. § 1275.103(d)(I)(ii), 39 Fed. Reg. 43,182 (1974). These costs are
limited to "real property taxes, utility rates or similar costs." Id.
56 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(l) (Supp. 1975).
57 Id.
1s Proposed HUD Reg. § 1277.103(h)(2)(i), 39 Fed. Reg. 45,135 (1974).
50 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(3) (Supp. 1975).
'0 This is defined as "those families whose incomes do not exceed 80 per centum of the
median income for the area." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(f)(l) (Supp. 1975).
61 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(5) (Supp. 1975).
62 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(5) (Supp. 1975).
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owner.6" Presumably the PHA, when it participates, will act as a rental
agent, maintaining a list of applicants and a list of eligible units and
referring qualifying applicants to the landlords participating in the
program.
Eviction rights vary with the type of housing unit. In the case of
existing units, the agency has the sole right to give notice to vacate.64
For newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated units, the owner
has that right. 65 Apparently the PHA will act as arbitrator between
landlord and tenant to determine whether a landlord's complaint
justifies eviction.66 No such finding is required of owners of newly
constructed rental housing, however:
E. Responsibility for Maintenance and
Management
The customary practice, both in federally financed programs and in
private leasing, is that the owner assumes responsibility for main-
tenance. This is true of Section 8 leasing as well." For existing units,
maintenance and repairs must be made "in accordance with the
standard practice for the building concerned as established by the
owner and agreed to by the agency." 68 At present no HUD regulations
clarifying management and maintenance standards exist.
63 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437f.(d)(l)(A), (e)(2) (Supp. 1975). This may appear to grant more
freedom to the owner than will actually be the case. Section 23 also provided that "the
selection of tenants. . . shall be the function of the owner." 42 U.S.C. § 1421b.(d)(1) (1971).
However, a subsequent Public Housing Authority Circular elaborated on this. There were
three possible methods of tenant selection under this circular: agency selection; owner
choice from a housing agency list; or owner selection on his or her own, so long as there was
no discrimination. Although the owner chose among the three methods, agency selection was
the most frequently chosen method though the owner had no right of final approval. This was
selected most often because only this option provided for agency payments if the unit became
vacant. Friedman, supra note 5, at 623; REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON URBAN
HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 16 (1969) [hereinafter cited as DECENT HOME].
64 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(d)(l)(B) (Supp. 1975). This poses a curious dilemma with respect
to existing units. The owner may have the freedom to choose the tenants; however, if he later
judges it to be a wrong decision, there might be no recourse. At best, this would seem to
encourage the owner to select conservatively. At worst, the owner of existing units may be
dissuaded from entering into the program at all. It appears arbitrary to designate the owner's
rights according to what point in the life of the unit the contract was formed because all new
construction or substantial rehabilitation will eventually, as the contract runs, become as
aged as some of the existing units which are later just entering the program. If this in fact
discourages the implementation of Section 8 with respect to existing units, the program might
be significantly hampered.
65 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(e)(2) (Supp. 1975). The expenses involved in eviction might also
be looked upon as a burden. However, this is probably offset by the delay and paperwork
involved with dependence on the agency.
66 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(d)(l)(B) states that "the agency shall have the sole right to give
notice to vacate, with the owner having the right to make representation to the agency for
termination of tenancy' [emphasis added]. Arguably, this indicates that the owner has a right
to have his complaints considered with the PHA acting as arbitrator.
67 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437f.(d)(l)(C), (e)(2) (Supp. 1975).
68 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(d)(l)(C) (Supp. 1975).
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F. Terms of Contracts and Construction Financing
Section 8 provides flexibility in the duration of assistance contracts.
For existing structures, contracts may run from a minimum of one
month to a maximum of fifteen years. 69 Newly constructed and sub-
stantially rehabilitated projects, financed by traditional means, are
eligible for contracts of up to twenty years' duration,7" while those
same projects financed by a state or local housing agency are eligible
for a forty-year contract. 71 Newly constructed or substantially rehabili-
tated units to be assisted under this program are eligible for FHA
mortgage insurance.72 In addition, an owner may pledge his prospective
assistance payment contract as security for a construction loan.73
Il. ALTERNATIVE HoUSING PROGRAMS
The new legislation, as indicated above, effectively subordinates
such programs as Sections 235 and 236 to public housing and leased
housing assistance.7 4 PHA officials apparently have considerable
discretion to implement that of the two programs which best suits their
local needs. With this in mind, this part explores some of the social,
economic, and political considerations which might persuade PHA
officials to choose a leased housing program over public housing and
prefer its formulation in Section 8 over its predecessor, Section 23.
A. Public Housing Compared with
Leased Housing
In contrast with assisted leased housing under either Section 23 or
Section 8 as described above, traditional public housing involves a
"project" which is planned, supervised in the construction phases,
owned, operated, and managed by the local housing authority.7 5 The
contention that such public ownership is the source of the adverse
conditions which are prevalent in most public housing76 is examined
below.
1. Tenant Selection: Achieving "Horizontal Equity"-Public hous-
ing tenants are selected by the agency from the pool of families who
69 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(d)(2) (Supp. 1975).
70 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(e)(1) (Supp. 1975).
7 Id.
72 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(e)(3) (Supp. 1975).
73 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(e)(4) (Supp. 1975).
74 See notes 38, 39, and accompanying text supra.
75 See generally Catz, supra note 4, at 26-33.
"' See Ledbetter, Public Housing-A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 LAW &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 490 (1967), for a thorough examination of several aspects of
public housing.
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qualify under the definition of "families of low income."77 Since the
waiting list of qualified applicants is normally considerably larger than
the supply of public housing units, public housing has been criticized
for lacking horizontal equity by failing to provide equal subsidies to
those equally in need. However, it is not clear that the housing supply
under any leased housing program will better accommodate the de-
mand for housing of low-income families than public housing. 78
2. Overincome Disqualification as a Disincentive to Upward Mobil-
ity-Under current regulations, a tenant is forced to move out of public
housing if his income rises above the maximum limit79 in order to
reserve the buildings for those who most need them. Such dislocations
have several deleterious consequences. Psychological strain and the
breakdown of the family social unit have frequently resulted from
such evictions.80 Moreover, the tenant with a marginally higher income
may be forced to spend a proportionately greater amount of his income
for private accommodations. Thus, the disqualification provision
operates as a disincentive for the tenant to earn more income. This
problem is eliminated under both leased housing programs since they
contain no such eviction provision. Section 8 provides that the tenant-
family need have low income status only "at the time it initially
occupied" the unit.8 The tenant continues to contribute the same
percentage as his income rises. However, the subsidy diminishes pro-
portionately as the tenant's total contribution increases. 82 Only when
the tenant's income exceeds 80 percent of the median area income
will the subsidy be discontinued. 3 At the point the subsidy ends, the
tenant has the option to remain in the unit, a choice unavailable in the
public housing program. This aspect of leased housing, therefore, may
lead to a more stable housing pattern and elimination of a disincentive
to upward mobility.
3. Project Concentrations-Normally built as unitary structures to
cut costs, large projects and the poor who occupy them are aggregated
in a single area, usually in the deteriorating central city which, unlike
the outlying districts, has insufficient political clout either to "zone-out"
such projects8 4 or to force the local governing body to withhold
77 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (1971). This definition has varied from act to act.
11 See Palmer, infra note 110, at 265-68; Friedman, supra note 5, at 621.
19 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(3) (1971).
10 A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK, 77-94 (1970).
81 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(4) (Supp. 1975).
82 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(3) (Supp. 1975).
83 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(f)(1) (Supp. 1975).
14 See Rubinowitz, Exclusionary Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a Renedy, 6 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 625 (1973).
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consent to build them. 5 One result is that public housing residency
now carries a stigma, 6 based in part upon the strong correlation
among fear of crime, social alienation, and residence in public housing
projects.87
The dreary appearance of housing projects has also drawn severe
criticism.88 These designs result not only from cost limitations but also
from HUD restraints upon the architects retained by the local agency.
Federal standards specify details down to the arrangement, size, and
shape of rooms within the unit, location of elevators and stairways,
and general location of interior facilities within each room, leaving
little room for flexibility or originality in the design. 89 A proposed
design must pass a series of reviews intended to minimize costs, result-
ing in a finished product with little aesthetic merit.9" The finished
product is often drab and uninspired. Little community pride is
developed, and all too often the deterioration process is drastically
accelerated. 91
Leased housing does have the potential for creating dispersion,
economic integration, and diversity of styles. One anticipated
advantage of leased housing in private accommodations is that the
Section 8 families may be scattered throughout the community. Ideally,
the tenant's low-income status will not be known by the other tenants
and thus the tenant will be less likely to be rejected by his neighbors
on the basis of his subsidy status. Furthermore, since there may be
greater potential for variety in the locations of subsidized units, the
tenant may be more able to find housing near his workplace.
Although new construction of leased housing remains subject to
exclusionary zoning, such restrictions are not an impairment to the
utilization of existing dwellings. An additional advantage is that there
is no "consent requirement" attached to the construction or rehabilita-
tion of assisted leased housing.
Finally it is the hope of the drafters of leased housing programs that
the market process will generate a better variety of innovative and
85 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437c.(e)(1) (Supp. 1975).
11 See generally Glazer, The Effects of Poor Housing, in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 158-65
(J. Pynoos, ed. 1973); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS REPORT: MORE THAN
SHELTER 57 (1968) (P. Douglas, Chairman); M. SCHOOR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY
16-33 (1963).
87 Rainwater, Fear and the House-as-Haven in the Lower Class, in HOUSING URBAN
AMERICA 181, 186-89 (J. Pynoos, ed. 1973).
88 Catz, supra note 4, at 29-32; Friedman, supra note 5, at 626-28; Ledbetter, supra note
76, at 497-501.
" Catz, supra note 4, at 31.
90 Id.
91 Cf. Rainwater, The Lessons of Pruitt-Igoe, in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA, 548-55 (J.
Pynoos, ed. 1973).
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aesthetically pleasing housing designs and styles, - since such leased
housing will be occupied in substantial part by unassisted tenants.
4. Fiscal Considerations-Leased housing also offers monetary ad-
vantages to the local government and to HUD which are not available
with housing projects. In order to receive federal subsidies, the
authorizing statute requires the local government to exempt housing
projects from property taxes. 93 In contrast, federally subsidized leased
housing properties remain on local tax rolls. 4 Participation in leased
housing programs is therefore more attractive for local governments
who opposed public housing because of the lost tax base.
5. Necessity of Long-Term Commitment-Public housing is fi-
nanced by HUD over the period of its mortgage; this may be for a pe-
riod of up to forty years. ' The contracts for leased housing assistance
may run for up to forty years, but are not required to do so.9" If the
local agency doubts the feasibility of a particular plan, the contract
may be made for as short a period as one month." Thus, HUD will not
have to be bound to a long-term and expensive commitment for a
dubious project.
Leased housing appears to have many advantages, but it has never
been developed into a program of major proportions.98 The acid test
for Section 8 is whether it will be implemented to a greater degree
than its forerunner, Section 23. The next subpart of this note attempts
to compare the two provisions in this respect.
B. Section 8 Compared with Section 23
Numerous explanations have been offered for the lack of success of
Section 23. This article will not resolve whether any or all of the
92 Leased housing will ameliorate these problems in several ways. First, there should be a
variety of designs and styles available to the tenants, as a consequence of involving a plethora
of owners. Second, the large-income family should have less difficulty finding housing. Due
to the mass production character of projects, there tend to be few large units. This is primarily
because it is more economical to build uniformly sized units which are gauged for the
"average" family. Ledbetter, supra note 76, at 498, 512.
One example is in Washington, D.C., in 1964, where only thirteen five-bedroom units were
available for 478 families on a waiting list for units of that size. Ledbetter, supra note 76, at
512.
In contrast, the private owner is not necessarily limited by these constraints, repeated
reviews, and design standards. That the private owner is more likely than the government to
build some larger units is evidenced by the fact that these larger units exist in greater quantity
in the private sector and had been incorporated into the Section 23 leased housing program.
Friedman, supra note 5, at 626-28.
93 42 U.S.C. § 1410(h) (1971).
14 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, PROGRESS REPORT OF FEDERAL HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1970).
95 42 U.S.C. § 1410(c) (1971).
96 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(e)(l) (Supp. 1975).
97 42 U.S.C.A. 88 1437f.(d)(2), (e)(l) (Supp. 1975).
" See note 34 supra.
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reasons are in fact legitimate. Rather, it will assess the applicability
of these criticisms to Section 8.
1. Implementation by Federal and Local Government-Community
and owner participation in the leased housing program is voluntary.
Therefore, incentives and requirements must be devised to encourage
participation. This has been cited as a defect of Section 23." In this
area, Section 8 provides several improvements over Section 23.
The prior act relied upon the local housing authority for implemen-
tation. As of 1975, there were approximately 113 local housing
authorities in Michigan.' ° The exact number is unavailable, but it is
clear that there are a considerable number of cities not served by a
local agency. 1'
Section 8 facilitates government initiation by providing that HUD
may enter directly into contracts with owners in such cases, or "where
the Secretary determines that a public housing agency is unable to
implement the provisions of this section 8." 102 Furthermore, the pro-
posed HUD Regulations provide that a State Housing Agency may
act in place of the local housing agency once it is so authorized. 1'0
Thus, the geographic area eligible under Section 8 is considerably
expanded over that of the prior leasing program, Section 23.104
2. Owner Incentives to Implement-Another alleged defect of Sec-
tion 23 which may be cured by Section 8 is the lack of incentives for
owner participation. The elaborate provisions for rent determination' 0'
might provide this motivation. Despite the limitation in Section 8 that
rents for assisted and unassisted units should not materially differ, 106
the possibility of additional adjustments up to 20 percent over the
"fair market rentals" should be attractive to prospective Section 8
owners. If the "fair market rentals" as determined by HUD are
accurate estimates of prevailing rental rates in the area and if
"materially" is liberally interpreted, then there is the chance for extra
profit for the owner. There was no comparable provision in Section 23.
99 The need for incentives finds support in the recommendations of THE REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON Low INCOME HOUSING: TOWARD BETTER HOUSING FOR Low
INCOME FAMILIES 11 (1970).
100 Telephone interview with HUD central office in Detroit, Mich., Feb. 7, 1975.
t1 The State of Michigan lists 475 cities and towns on an official map; it is comprised of
58,216 square miles.
102 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(b)(l) (Supp. 1975).
03 Proposed HUD Reg. § 1278.101 et seq., 39 Fed. Reg. 42,753 (1974).
104 One Detroit HUD representative assigned to § 8 said that this is one of the most
significant changes from § 23. He explained that HUD had hesitated to approve funding for
§ 23 since it had no control over the units. If this is true, then this provision may encourage
implementation of the program. Telephone interview, H UD Central Office in Detroit, Michi-
gan, Nov. 15, 1974.
105 See part 11 A supra.
106 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 1975).
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These Section 8 provisions, on the other hand, may provide a loophole
through which developers could continue the excessive profit-taking
prevalent under the Sections 235 and 236 programs. 107 These induce-
ments to Section 8 participation may be ineffective, however, in a
"tight" housing market such as that which currently exists. As the
demand for unit increases, the profits earned on nonsubsidized units
tend to rise and the motivation to participate in the subsidy program,
with its attendant restrictions, inconvenience, and paperwork,
decreases. Unfortunately, periods of few housing starts with resulting
increases in rentals for all grades of housing are precisely the times
when low-income families need assistance the most.
Another aspect of the problem is that owners of substandard units
should be encouraged to rehabilitate them in order to join the program.
Commentators have suggested the incentives were insufficient under
Section 23 to induce major repairs.0 8 The statute did not contemplate
the necessity for a major overhaul of a unit or building; Section 23
merely provided that units may be selected for rehabilitation if the
agency "finds that such units are, or may be made, suitable ... .
Section 23 was limited to what Section 8 has classified as "existing"
housing, often involving older and deteriorated units. 10 The possibility
of leasing with the local agency before a unit was built or rehabilitated
was not a viable option because, the local agency and the developer
were exposed to the risk that the federal government would not sub-
sidize the project upon completion."' For this reason, the President's
Committee on Housing recommended that the existing structure limi-
tation be removed to permit new units to be utilized more easily.112
Section 8 authorizes contracts for "newly constructed" and "substan-
tially rehabilitated" units as well as "existing" units." 3 The fact that
107 See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
108 Friedman, supra note 5, at 632.
109 42 U.S.C. § 1421b.(c)(1) (1971).
110 Palmer, § 23 Housing: Low-Rent Housing in Private Accommodations, 48 J. URBAN L.
255, 278 (1970).
111 Id. at 257.
112 DECENT HOME, supra note 63, at 16.
113 "Newly constructed" has not been defined as of this writing. Presumably it refers to
units constructed after or within a certain period before the entrance of the building into the
program.
"Substantial rehabilitation" is defined as
a condition requiring more than routine or minor repairs or improvements of
such extent as to necessitate execution of an agreement prior to the perfor-
mance of the work. Substantial rehabilitation may vary in degree from gutting
and extensive reconstruction to cosmetic improvements coupled with cure of
substantial accumulations of deferred maintenance.
Proposed HUD Reg. § 1277.102(bb), 39 Fed. Reg. 45,134 (1974).
Existing housing is defined as "housing that is in decent safe, and sanitary condition."
Proposed HUD Reg. § 1275.101(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 43,180 (1974). "Decent," "safe," and
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Section 8 grants greater eviction rights to the owner of substantially
rehabilitated units than to the owner of an existing unit" 4 arguably
evidences a congressional desire to stimulate the entrance of sub-
stantially rehabilitated housing into the program. Other provisions in
Section 8 facilitate this: not only does the owner of substantially
rehabilitated units possess additional rights, but Section 8 also qualifies
such owners for insured financing for substantial rehabilitation; 15
Section 8 also extends the maximum lease period to forty years for
substantially rehabilitated as well as newly constructed units if the
loans for the buildings have been guaranteed by a state or local agency
loan program. 116 Fifteen years is the maximum contract term for
structures classified as existing.1 7 This minimizes the developer's risk
for substantial rehabilitation or new construction." 8 Even for non-
guaranteed loan projects the maximum lease period extends to twenty
years for new or substantially rehabilitated units." 9
3. Selection of Units-Constraints on the selection of units are
another reason suggested for the failure to implement Section 23.
Authorizations were limited to instances where the cost of Section 23
leasing was less than that of construction of a comparable public
housing unit. 2 ' Such comparative cost figures are conflicting, 121
possibly because the estimated cost of leased housing must include a
long-range projection of the rise in rentals due to inflation. Thus, it
is unclear how far this restriction actually impeded implementation
of Section 23. This provision has been eliminated in Section 8.
A further restriction on Section 23 was that no more than 10 percent
of the units in any one building were to be subsidized under Section
23.122 Of necessity, this was merely a guideline in structures containing
"sanitary" are further defined in Proposed HUD Reg. § 1277.102(e), 39 Fed. Reg. 45,133
(1974).
14 See notes 64, 65, and accompanying text supra.
115 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(e)(3) (Supp. 1975). The unit would first have to qualify as needing
substantial rehabilitation and not just cosmetic repair. See note 113 supra.
116 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(e)(l) (Supp. 1975).
117 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(d)(2) (Supp. 1975).
11s That this was a purpose of extending the lease is reported by the House Banking and
Currency Committee which
• . . considers a 20-year term for new units to be sufficiently long to enable the
owner to obtain 30 to 40 year mortgage financing. However, the committee has
authorized a 40-year term where the project is to be owned by a State or local
agency. The committee understands that a longer term is needed in these
situations to assure the marketability by these agencies of their own 40-year
bonds.
H.R. 1114, 93d Cong, 2d Sess. 19 (1974).
119 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(e)(l) (Supp. 1975).
120 42 U.S.C. §§ 1421b.(e), (a)(l) (1971).
121 See Friedman, supra note 5, at 629; R. MUTH, PUBLIC HOUSING: AN ECONOMIC
EVALUATION 45 (1973). Contra, Catz, supra note 4, at 35.
122 42 U.S.C. § 1421b.(c) (1971).
SPRING 1975]
Journal of Law Reform
fewer than ten units. This restriction was an attempt to disperse the
subsidized tenants to avoid a "project" atmosphere. Section 8 may be
read as diluting this policy in order to facilitate implementation and
to introduce flexibility into the leasing program, by providing that up
to 100 percent of the units in any structure may be subsidizetd. 1 3 It
might appear that the goal of economically integrating the tenants has
been abandoned, but a more likely explanation for this provision is
that the drafters of Section 8 chose to achieve integration among build-
ings in an area rather than within buildings. One vestige of the Section
23 emphasis on avoiding a concentration of subsidized tenants within
one building remains: Section 8 provides that if the project contains (1)
more than fifty units, and (2) is designed for use primarily by nonelder-
ly and nonhandicapped persons, then the Secretary "may" give "prefer-
ence" to applications of owners involving not more than 20 percent of
the units in a project.124 However, this provision does not evidence a
strong commitment to economic integration. "Preference" assumes an
abundance of applications over those authorized or needed. 125 If few
owners are willing to contract for less than 20 percent, the "prefer-
ence" concept appears to be specious. Even if the assumption that
there will be many applicants is valid, the discretion granted by the
word "may" could be read as undermining the policy of promoting
economic integration. Giving this objective low priority may result in
more widespread use of the leased housing assistance program, but
only at the risk of incurring some of the same effects that the leasing
program was originally designed to avoid.126
Another possible reason for the failure to implement Section 23 is
the HUD moratorium on leasing based on local vacancy rates. HUD
urged that Section 23 should not be used if it would reduce the vacancy
rate of other units of comparable size to below 3 percent. Reportedly
this would prevent the government from competing with the private
sector in the housing business'12 7 and may be justifiable since a conse-
quence of such competition would be increased rental rates for the
nonpoor' 28 Section 8 may provide a solution to this problem if new
construction under Section 8 can keep pace with the dwindling supply
of existing units.
4. Selection of Tenants-In contrast to the increased flexibility of
123 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(5) (Supp. 1975).
124 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(5) (Supp. 1975).
125 See part IV infra on the questionability of that assumption.
"26 See part III A supra.
127 Catz, supra note 4, at 35.
28 Friedman, supra note 5, at 634.
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Section 8 with respect to units, it imposes additional restrictions on
the selection of tenants. The language of Section 23 contained no
guidelines as to tenant selection. To maintain their image, the public
housing agencies tended to choose only the most "placeable"' 29 ten-
ants. This generally excluded the extremely poor, large families and
unmarried mothers. 3 ' The "rich-poor" or "submerged middle class" '131
was often the group assisted by Section 23,
Section 8, in contrast, requires that at least 30 percent of the units
in the program must be occupied by "very low income" families,132
defined as families whose income does not exceed 50 percent of the
median income of the area."'3 It should be noted, however, that "area"
is undefined for the purpose of determining average income. The 30
percent figure has been reported to apply to nationwide allocations
rather than local ones."' This requirement apparently is an attempt to
include tenants who previously were relegated to public housing
projects." 5 This shift in emphasis may discourage owners from partici-
pating at all. In such a circumstance, any prospects for placement
under Section 8 lie with the local agency. Section 8 allows the local
housing agency to act as an owner in the program,"36 and presumably
the agency will be less deterred from participation by a personal re-
luctance to deal with very low income families. Thus, a possible
interpretation is that the 30 percent requirement may be met almost
exclusively by agency-owned units. This poses a difficult choice
between providing expanded leased housing opportunities for the very
poor or promoting private owner participation in the program with
the resulting lesser degree of economic and racial integration. The
former appears to call either for government ownership or for
incentives for the private owner which are adequate to induce
entrance into the program. Incentives which are sufficient to overcome
the owner's prejudices may be too expensive; to obtain nonproject
housing for the "undesirable" tenant, government ownership may be
the only feasible alternative.
Section 23 generally struck a balance in favor of private accommo-
dations and a scattering of the subsidized tenants at the cost of a
129 See Palmer, supra note 110, at 265-68 (for what "placeable" meant in St. Louis,
Missouri, in 1970); Friedman, supra note 5, at 621-22 (foran idea of the "desirable tenant" in
California in 1967).
130 Id.
13' Friedman, supra note 5, at 621.
132 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(c)(7) (Supp. 1975).
133 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f.(f)(2) (Supp. 1975).
'3 See 31 J. HOUSING 355 (1974).
132 Friedman, supra note 5, at 622.
136 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437c, 1437f.(e)(1) (Supp. 1975).
SPRING 1975]
Journal of Law Reform
minimum of economic and racial integration.'37 Section 8 has shifted
the emphasis somewhat by providing for agency ownership and by
allowing 100 percent of a structure to house subsidized tenants."' The
positive aspect of this may be that tenants are incorporated into the
program where they otherwise might not be. On the other hand, if 100
percent of the occupants are subsidized very low-income tenants, or
if the structure is owned by the local agency, then the building differs
little from a public housing project. Thus, these tenants may not be
receiving the benefits which leased housing assistance was originally
intended to grant. The same project stigma and economic and racial
concentration may result. 39 These very low-income tenants may not
be worse off, but this may also consume funds which could be used to
achieve leased housing goals which are different from the public hous-
ing goals. It could also taint the program with a public housing
reputation with a consequent loss of political support.140
IV. THE POLICY CHOICES
The future of Section 8 depends on whether there are sufficient
economic incentives to encourage owners to participate. Because the
program depends on private owner volunteers, Section 8's potential
must be assessed in light of these inducements. The analysis is further
complicated by the fact that the motivations to participate in the
program will vary with the general condition of the economy.
When the demand for leased housing is high or a building is a
desirable place to live, the owner can rapidly replace any nonsubsidized
tenants who leave or are delinquent in paying. In such cases, the
economic incentives of a guaranteed fair market value rental are
probably insufficient. Section 8 is vulnerable to conditions in the
housing market in two respects. First, because implementation of
leased housing assistance is dependent upon an abundant housing
supply, it is at the mercy of other government programs' 4' which at-
137 Friedman, supra note 5, at 622.
13 See notes 123, 136 and accompanying text supra. A choice was consciously made in
favor of providing leased housing for the less desirable tenants instead of placing a priority on
dispersion of the tenants by the House Banking and Currency Committee, H. Rep., supra
note 118, at 20.
139 See part III A supra.
140 A strong indication of the political unpopularity of the public housing program is that
appropriations often went begging. Furthermore, voters have often completely rejected
public housing or have rejected bond issues to finance the program. See Friedman, Public
Housing and the Poor, in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 448-49 (J. Pynoos, ed. 1973).
14 Current or proposed measures include measures to lower the interest rate on lending,
tax relief, liberalizing the requirements for FHA loans, and any other programs which
promote a healthy housing industry.
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tempt to strengthen the housing industry as a whole. 142 Secondly, unless
the local housing agencies are the only "owners" participating, the
success of Section 8 is contingent upon the general economic picture.
Section 8 may be unresponsive to the needs of the low-income tenant
during such times of housing crisis, which may be its most crucial
shortcoming. The national housing policy needs to address itself
primarily to the problem of encouraging the the expansion of the
housing supply. Several prominent legislators believed that Section
236 of the 1968 Act had a good record in this area,143 and that the
1974 Act's de-emphasis of Sections 235 and 236 and promotion of
Section 8'11 was not a wise choice.
145
Giving primary priority to providing housing, albeit conglomerate
government housing, has the advantage of a higher probability of
success in ameliorating at least one of society's problems, i.e., housing
for those who can not afford it. However, since the traditional public
housing programs have often been considered failures, 146 housing alone
may not be enough. Advocates of leased housing assistance urge that
federal housing programs not merely provide housing but also be
designed to reduce the stigma of a subsidy, minimize concentration of
assisted tenants, and reduce the presence of the government as far as
possible by involving the private sector. Unfortunately, though, it may
be unrealistic to expect a housing program to solve sociological as well
as economic difficulties. The problem is exacerbated by the program's
vulnerability to the ups and downs of the housing industry as a whole.
To resolve the problem, the very elusive line between additional im-
provements and infeasibility must be identified.
A related problem is the balance that might have to be struck
between providing housing and achieving economic integration.
Underlying the economic integration issue is the question whether
economic and racial integration can be accomplished through a
housing subsidy program.14 Even assuming units are vacant and
suitable, Section 8 must overcome the reluctance of the individual
owner to racially and economically integrate the tenants.148 The public
142 See Silk, Homebuilders' Prognosis, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1974, at 63, col. 7, for some
statistics on the reduction in housing starts.
'4' See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
144 See note 34 supra.
145 See generally What Form Should Housing Subsidies Take?, 31 J. HOUSING 160 (1974).
146 See Friedman, supra note 140, on the perceived failures of public housing. See notes
12-19 and accompanying text supra on the demise of §§ 235 and 236.
147 The issues are intertwined since income levels often parallel racial lines. See Friedman,
Social Class and Reform, in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 25, 27 (J. Pynoos, ed. 1973).
148 It is not clear that the goal of integration hindered implementation of Section 23. At
least a diverse socio-economic mix was not a deterrent to people seeking housing according
to one survey by the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials. The
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housing agency and the owner are motivated by a desire to maintain a
certain appearance. 149 If integration is perceived as defeating that
image"' ° and if integration is inextricably tied to leased housing
assistance, then the program may not achieve its expected potential.
Government housing programs inevitably face conflicting values: a
choice between providing housing for as many people as possible or
achieving social goals such as integration and minimization of the role
of the government along with providing housing for some. While the
placements that were made under Section 23 tended -to favor the latter
alternative, Section 8 appears to have shifted priorities toward the
former.
-Nancy S. Cohen
study concluded that what is crucial to the tenants is good design and maintenance. Assuming
this to be true, though, it does not completely answer the question of whether prejudice
played a part in the failure of Section 23. Even if the tenants do not mind integration, the
owner might be ignorant of this fact and may have other disincentives related to the image of
the building. Bryan, Can "Economic Mix" in Housing Work?, 31 J. HOUSING 367 (1974).
149 Friedman, supra note 5, at 622.
150 It seemed to be so perceived in California, for example. Friedman, supra note 5, at 621.
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